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Models used to guide policy, as well as some empirical studies, suggest that the effect of housing wealth
on consumption is large and greater than the wealth effect on consumption from stock holdings.  Recent
theoretical work, in contrast, argues that changes in housing wealth are offset by changes in housing
consumption, meaning that unexpected shocks in housing wealth should have little effect on non-housing
consumption. We reexamine the impact of housing wealth on non-housing consumption, employing
the Case-Quigley-Shiller data on U.S. housing wealth that have been used in prior studies to estimate
a large housing wealth effect.  Existing empirical work fails to control for the fact that changes in housing
wealth may be correlated with changes in expected permanent income, biasing the resulting estimates.
Once we control for the endogeneity bias resulting from the correlation between housing wealth and
permanent income, we find that housing wealth has a small and insignificant effect on consumption.
Additional analysis of time-series results provides further support for that view.
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I.  Introduction 
  In the United States, the housing cycle has been found to be a uniquely reliable indicator 
of the business cycle, and housing investment appears to have a disproportionately large impact 
on the rest of the economy (Green, 1997, Gauger and Snyder, 2003, Miles, 2009).  Indeed, 
Leamer (2007) drives this point home by titling his study “Housing IS the Business Cycle,” and 
concludes with the suggestion that a new “Taylor Rule” be employed by the Federal Reserve that 
replaces output with residential investment as a better means to guide monetary policy.  Doing 
so, Leamer argues, would decrease the intensity of business cycles. The current business cycle 
seems to offer further evidence that swings in housing are central to business cycles. 
  The relative importance of the various channels through which the housing cycle are 
related to other sectors in the economy, however, remains controversial. Housing investment, 
and the forward and backward linkages between construction demand and other sectors of the 
economy, is one potentially important channel. Another is consumption; macroeconomic models 
typically posit a wealth effect through which increases in the value of the housing stock raise 
consumption demand: when housing prices rise, consumers experience an increase in wealth, and 
increase spending accordingly. 
Prominent economists and policy makers, such as former Fed governor Frederic Mishkin 
(2007), have found evidence of a large wealth effect from housing (much larger than the 
estimated wealth effect from stocks), although Mishkin (2007) recognizes that estimates of 
housing wealth effects are imprecisely measured.  Other Fed officials, such as Ben Bernanke, 
Donald Kohn, and Charles Plosser have made public statements indicating their belief in the 
housing wealth effect.  Indeed the Federal Reserve employs a model, which presumably guides 
its policies, that assumes the housing wealth effect is large and significant.   2
  A number of recent empirical papers have examined the housing wealth effect.  Two of 
the most widely cited recent studies, (Case, et al., 2005, and Carroll, et al., 2006) not only find 
significant housing wealth effects, but both also find that the wealth effect from housing is larger 
than the wealth effect from stocks.  If these results are correct, the housing wealth effect is 
indeed an important channel through which housing affects the economy, and policymakers at 
the Fed are correct to take this channel into account when formulating policy.   
The theoretical underpinnings of the housing wealth effect, however, remain 
controversial. Buiter (2008) shows that housing wealth effects should be of second-order 
importance for non-housing consumption.  In his model, housing value increases result in higher 
housing consumption costs that offset the housing wealth effect on non-housing consumption; 
any effect from increases in housing values on non-housing consumption, therefore, should be 
small and primarily reflect the impact of the relaxation of borrowing constraints on consumers 
(given housing’s special value as collateral for consumer borrowing). Sinai and Souleles (2005) 
present a somewhat different model of the housing wealth effect, but one with similar 
implications to Buiter (2008): increases in housing wealth should affect the distribution of 
consumption much more than its aggregate amount. The theoretical concerns raised by these 
articles are echoed by some policy makers:  Buiter (2008) quotes Bank of England Governor 
Mervyn King who states that “housing wealth isn’t wealth.”   
In addition to the lack of a clear theoretical rationale for a housing wealth effect, there are 
empirical and data problems that raise questions about past estimates.  Carroll, et al. (2006) 
employ as their measure of housing wealth a residual metric from total wealth from the Flow of 
Funds accounts.  Close inspection reveals that much of this measure − sometimes more than fifty 
percent − consists of non-housing wealth.  Case. et al. (2005) employ a more reliable and   3
disaggregated measure of the stock of housing wealth for the fifty U.S. states, which is based on 
actual house price indices and the number of existing houses.  These authors employ a panel 
estimation approach, rather than an aggregate time series, which increases the number of 
observations and the power of their tests.  Their estimation strategy, however, suffers from 
possible endogeniety bias; as we will show, when one corrects for this endogeneity bias, their 
finding of a large wealth effect disappears. 
In this paper, we investigate the housing wealth effect using the state-level Case-Quigley-
Shiller (hereinafter CQS) data set (Case, et al., 2005).  We employ lags for the housing and stock 
wealth variables, following a method to address simultaneity issues suggested by Hall (1978), 
Auerbach and Hassett (1989) and Campbell and Mankiw (1990).  After investigating the 
robustness of our results across many different specifications, we find that, in all but four of the 
thirty-two specifications we investigate, housing wealth has no significant effect on 
consumption.  In the four cases in which home prices appear to have some impact, the effect is 
significant only at the ten percent level, and its magnitude is less than the stock wealth effect, 
contrary to CQS, Carroll et al. (2006), and the U.S. Federal Reserve.   
We conclude that the housing wealth effect has been overstated. While we do not deny 
that housing is perhaps the most important sector of the economy with respect to business cycle 
fluctuations, that link likely reflects channels other than the housing wealth effect (Leamer 2007 
concurs with that view).  
This paper proceeds as follows.  The following section describes the existing literature on 
the housing wealth effect.  The next section describes our methodology.  The fourth section 
discusses our results, and the fifth section concludes.   
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II. Previous Empirical Literature 
  Poterba (2000) summarizes the issues and findings relating to consumption effects of 
increases in stock values. He points out that, even in the absence of credit constraints or other 
imperfections, agents that are rational, forward-looking optimizers should increase consumption 
in response to the higher wealth that stock price increases create.  It is therefore unsurprising that 
a number of papers (Ludvigson and Steindel, 1999, is one of many examples) find a significant, 
positive consumption wealth effect from stock price increases.   
   Housing, like stock, is an asset, and there have been a number of studies investigating 
whether housing wealth affects consumption.  The model employed by the Federal Reserve 
assumes that the value of housing has the same effect on consumption as the value of financial 
assets.  It may not be the case, however, that the wealth effects from housing and stocks are the 
same.  CQS point out that, among other differences, households may not be able to easily 
measure wealth from an increase in home prices.  Furthermore, an increase in home prices may 
be perceived as being more or less temporary than a rise in shares.  Furthermore, as already 
noted, Buiter (2008) points out that houses are not simply assets, but rather are both assets and 
consumption goods.  In theory, that fact should reduce the size of the wealth effect of housing 
wealth on non-housing consumption, and make wealth effects on consumption from housing 
wealth smaller than wealth effects from other wealth components.   
  Given the potential differences in housing and stock wealth for consumption, a number of 
studies have investigated the housing wealth effect empirically.  Several studies employ micro 
data on households, with conflicting results.  Campbell and Cocco (2007) find that, for British 
households, an increase in home values raises consumption.     5
Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton and Leicester (2009), on the other hand, employ micro-level 
British survey data, and find no wealth effect from house prices.  Their results are particularly 
damaging to the notion of a large housing wealth effect.  The authors posit that the correlation 
between housing wealth and consumption may arise from three possibilities: a straightforward 
wealth effect, the relaxation of credit constraints, or the response of both housing wealth and 
consumption to common third factors, such as expected future income.  The authors find that the 
estimated “wealth” effect is the same for both homeowners and renters, which casts the credit 
constraint channel in doubt.  Moreover, the authors find the purported impact on consumption 
from house prices is greater for young than for older households.  This makes a straightforward 
wealth effect very questionable, as older households are most likely to own houses, while 
younger households are more likely to be saving for a home purchase, and if anything may 
theoretically experience a negative wealth effect.  Levin (1998), similarly, finds virtually no 
housing wealth effect on consumption in the United States.   
Several studies using aggregate data find a significant impact of housing on consumption.  
A number of such studies, until the last several years, relied on cointegration analysis, as 
permanent income/life cycle models of consumption implied a stable long-run relationship 
between consumption and forms of wealth such as housing or stock holdings.  These studies, 
however, often failed to find stable cointegrating vectors, which does not surprise Carroll, et al. 
(2006).  These authors point out that  
…cointegration models implicitly require the existence of a stable long-run relationship 
between consumption, labor income, and wealth.  Theory implies no such stability, unless 
every major facet of the economy is perpetually unchanging.  Even for the U. S., the 50 
year span of available data has seen major changes in taxes, productivity growth, 
financial structure, social insurance , and every other aspect of reality incorporated in the 
theory (and embodied in the cointegrating vector).  It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
empirical tests strongly suggest instability in the cointegrating vectors. (p. 1)  
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  Thus while still desiring to imbed the estimation of wealth effects in a permanent income 
consumption framework, Carroll, et al. eschew cointegration and follow an estimation approach 
that builds on Hall (1978).  
In Hall’s canonical specification, if agents are Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) 
consumers, and there are no market imperfections such as credit constraints, consumption should 
follow a random walk.  In particular, if consumption is a random walk, then: 
  t t t C C ε + = −1  (1) 
or equivalently, 
  t t C ε = Δ  (2) 
where  t ε  is random error − in this case, changes in expected permanent income.   
  To test the random walk hypothesis, (2) is augmented by adding variables such as 
changes in stock or housing wealth or past changes in income or consumption.  Since changes in 
expected permanent income ( t ε  ) are likely correlated with changes in current transitory income 
or wealth, these variables cannot be entered directly into (2).  Instead, instruments (any lagged 
value of changes in wealth, consumption or income are valid) must be employed.   
  Hall (1978) initially found only lagged stock prices to be significant as regressors in (2), 
giving some support to the random walk hypothesis.  In contrast, other authors, such as Campbell 
and Mankiw (1990) have found later lags of consumption to be significant, suggesting 
substantial deviations from the PIH, perhaps in the form of credit constraints.   
  Carroll, et al. (2006) build a model that explicitly takes account of consumption 
persistence, and thus deviates from Hall’s assumption of a random walk for consumption. 
Theoretically, Carroll, et al. (2006) develop a model of habit formation to allow for the 
possibility that changes in wealth can exert effects on consumption.  They also introduce other   7
innovations in the measurement of consumption change over time, which take into account of the 
implications of persistence in consumption. The authors find that, when lags of measured 
housing and stock wealth are entered into an empirical consumption model, both have significant 
effects.  Indeed, the impact of housing wealth is larger than that of stock wealth, and that effect is 
much larger in the long run than in the short run.   
  Carroll, et al. (2006) present results that are motivated by a clear theoretical framework.  
There are, however, two potential problems with their results. First, consumption persistence 
may reflect adjustment costs in consumption behavior rather than habit formation. This is an 
important distinction because it implies that lagged consumption is not a sufficient statistic for 
forecasting future permanent income. The lagging responsiveness of consumption to permanent 
income shocks complicates the problem of endogeneity bias when measuring the effects of 
wealth change on consumption. If housing and stock prices anticipate and are endogenous to 
changes in permanent income, and if consumption adjusts to these changes in permanent income 
with a lag, then a large housing wealth effect on current consumption (large positive coefficients 
on lagged housing wealth in a regression that includes lagged consumption and lagged housing 
wealth) may simply indicate a speedier adjustment of housing wealth to permanent income 
shocks, rather than any causal relationship between housing wealth increases and subsequent 
consumption.  
Carroll, et al. (2006) recognize that their specification for the housing wealth effect, 
which does not even include lagged consumption in the equation measuring  the impact of 
lagged housing wealth on current consumption, can be criticized for potential endogeneity bias. 
They argue, however, that the fact that housing wealth effects appear both in aggregate studies 
and in microeconometric studies of individual behavior suggests that endogeneity bias is small.   8
We do not agree with that conclusion. Endogeneity bias can be important in studies of 
household-level consumption. For example, if consumers who bid up prices of houses do so 
because they anticipate a rises in income that are location-specific, then that expected future rise 
in income and consumption may be reflected first in rising house prices.   
The second potential problem with Carroll, et al.’s (2006) analysis involves possibile 
measurement error in their measure of housing wealth.    The authors use Flow of Funds data 
from the Federal Reserve, and measure housing wealth as total net worth minus stock wealth.  
However, this residual net worth includes assets besides stocks and housing, such as consumer 
durables, equipment and software, non-housing real estate holdings, wealth owned by non-profit 
organizations, and non-equity financial assets.  In the fourth quarter of 2004, for instance, (the 
last observation in Carroll, et al.’s sample), more than half of “housing wealth” consists of non-
housing wealth: real estate holdings by households (over 16.5 trillion dollars) are less than half 
the value of net worth minus stock wealth (over 33.4 trillion).   
Below we investigate the potential importance of endogeneity bias for the measurement 
of housing wealth effects. We also explore the implications of correcting the aggregate housing 
wealth measure by Carroll, et al. (2006) to exclude non-housing assets.  Of course, even that 
corrected, aggregate measure is likely to be a poor one. The difficulty of getting good measures 
of housing wealth has plagued studies of the consumption wealth effect.  Muellbauer (2007), for 
instance, similarly finds a positive wealth effect from housing using aggregate U.S. data.  
However, he notes that U.S. aggregate data are not very informative (compared with that of the 
UK) and regards his results as “preliminary” (p. 269, 307). 
CQS adopt a somewhat different approach to measuring the housing wealth effect.  They 
begin by noting that “[r]esearch designed to quantify an effect of changes in wealth on changes   9
in consumption, going back to Ando and Modigliani (1963), has largely used aggregate measures 
of wealth that emphasize the stock market and make no credible attempt to measure housing 
wealth with any accuracy.” (p. 4).   
  CQS develop two alternative sets of data to investigate the housing wealth effect.  The 
first is a panel of national-level data covering fourteen different countries.  The authors concede 
that “it relies upon consumption measures derived from national income accounts, not our 
imputations, and there is reason to suspect that housing prices and housing wealth in this panel 
are measured less accurately” (p. 8).   
CQS  also develop a second panel dataset for the fifty U.S. states, at quarterly frequency, 
for the years 1982-1999.  Their measure of consumption is retail sales, provided by Regional 
Financial Associates.    Importantly, rather than relying on a residual (and poorly measured) 
metric for house wealth in the U.S., the authors construct a house wealth index for each state.  
The authors construct their measure based on the number of households in each state, as well as 
the homeownership rate.  They assemble state-by state data on home prices for each quarter, 
employing the Case-Shiller index for the states in which that index was available, and the 
OFHEO home price index where the Case-Shiller index lacked coverage. For purposes of 
measuring housing wealth effects, the OFHEO index is less precise than the Case-Shiller index 
because it does not weight houses by their value, but rather, assigns equal weight to all houses.   
  The CQS study, then, employs the most detailed measure of housing wealth, in terms of 
the number of homes owned and their value, of any study on the wealth effect of housing of 
which we are aware.
1  The authors proceed to estimate the effects of wealth on consumption in a 
                                                 
1 Both indexes are based on comparisons over time of transactions involving the same house, in contrast to hedonic 
pricing models that attempt to control for house characteristics. These same-sales indexes, however, can suffer from 
selectivity bias relating to the timing of particular types of house sales. For example, during the 2007-2009 period, 
housing sales include a large proportion of distressed home sales (foreclosures and the like), and observed values of   10
variety of ways, such as modeling the level of consumption as a function of the level of stock 
and housing wealth, as well as income. Alternatively, they model the difference in consumption 
as a function of differences in housing, stock wealth and income. Case et al. (2005) also estimate 
a version of an error correction model, in which the parameters of the cointegrating vector are 
imposed (income affects consumption one-to-one).  In all of these specifications, housing wealth 
is found to have a positive and significant effect on consumption, and in nearly all cases, the 
impact of housing wealth is larger than that of stock wealth.  Case et al. (2005) also perform an 
important robustness check. They test for asymmetric impacts of housing wealth, and find that, 
while an increase in house wealth raises consumption, a decrease in house wealth has no effect 
on consumption.   
   While the improved measurement of housing wealth is a major contribution of CQS, 
there are important empirical problems with their estimation method. First, two of their 
estimations simply regress levels of consumption on levels of income, without taking account of 
the stationarity properties of the variables.  The fact that the authors estimate error-correction 
models later highlights the importance of accounting for what has typically been found to be the 
nonstationarity of consumption and income.  The authors do not test for cointegration (which 
Carroll, et al. 2006, criticize), but rather, in their cointegration specifications they simply impose 
a cointegrating vector with a parameter of one for the effect of income on consumption.   
  There is one specification which does appear to address the nonstationarity issue without 
imposing cointegration.  In Table 3, CQS regress the difference of consumption on the 
differences of housing and stock wealth and income, again, finding a positive, significant impact 
                                                                                                                                                             
the indexes may provide an exaggerated picture of housing price decline. Indeed, Leventis (2008) provides evidence 
that this is the case. One could make a similar argument that during the subprime housing boom of 2004-2006, 
transactions gave an unrepresentative and exaggerated picture of housing price increases. Nevertheless, during the 
sample period employed by Case et al. (2005), when neither a subprime boom or bust was occurring, selectivity bias 
should be much less.   11
of housing wealth.  This specification also comes close to the standard studies of consumption 
such as Hall (1978) and Campbell and Mankiw (1990).   
But there is one important difference between the empirical CQS models and these 
former studies.  CQS regress the current change in consumption on the current change in 
income, housing and stock wealth.  This causes a potentially severe problem of endogeneity. 
Because they do not control for shocks related to permanent income, it is possible that their 
results are driven by correlations between permanent income shocks (which should be the 
dominant source of housing price changes across time and across states) and housing price 
changes. In other words, in states where housing prices are rising, that rise reflects not just past 
income growth, but expectations of future income growth, which may produce improvements in 
many current market indicators, including rising home values. 
  Referring back to the pure random walk theory, if the PIH holds, the  t ε   term in (2) 
represents only unexpected changes in permanent income.  If the PIH does not hold perfectly, 
due, for example, to the existence of credit constraints, habit formation, or adjustment costs in 
consumption, then  t ε  represents a combination of unexpected changes in permanent income, 
expected and unexpected changes in current transitory income, expected changes in permanent 
income, and expected and unexpected changes in housing and stock wealth.  However, changes 
in stock and housing wealth are likely correlated with other changes in expected and unexpected 
permanent and transitory income.  Thus using current changes in housing or stock wealth as 
regressors in (2) will lead to inconsistent estimates. In particular, one may ascribe to housing and 
stock wealth a causal impact on  consumption that really reflects anticipated or unanticipated 
changes in permanent or transitory income.     12
  These potential problems are especially worrying given the theoretical perspectives that 
imply small housing wealth effects on consumption, noted above.  According to Buiter (2008), 
houses are both assets and consumption goods that derive value from the shelter services they 
provide.  In this scenario, a drop in housing prices hurts those “long” housing-those who own 
more housing than they plan to consume over their lifetime, and helps those “short” housing-
those currently renting who may plan to buy in the future.  On average, since a country’s 
residents own their own housing, there should be no wealth effect, save for a distributional 
effect.   
  Sinai and Souleles (2005) present a model with related implications.  They assume that 
agents must live somewhere, and thus face “liabilities” in terms of future housing costs.  Thus 
homeowners who experience an increase in home prices have experienced an increase in the 
price of an asset they own, but also an equivalent increase in their future rental liabilities.  The 
logic of this model suggests little if any wealth effect from housing, as any increase in “wealth” 
is offset by an increase in housing liabilities. Given the conflicting beliefs and theories about the 
housing wealth effect, the actual impact of a change in house prices on consumption is an 
empirical question, which should be investigated in a PIH framework, using reliable data, and 
avoiding potential endogeneity bias from the correlations between the components of income and 
housing wealth. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
  Given the problems associated with previous attempts to measure housing wealth noted 
by CQS, we employ their dataset, which we consider the most carefully constructed measure of   13
housing wealth for the United States of which we are aware.
2  For comparison with time-series 
studies, we use Carroll, et al.’s (2006) U.S. data for our aggregate time series tests.
3     
  CQS start with (2) and seek to augment the model and estimate the following: 
  t t t t t Y SW HW C ε β β β β + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ 3 2 1 0  (3) 
where HW is housing wealth, SW is stock wealth, and Y is personal income.  Case et al. (2005) 
test the significance of the  1 β  parameter and conduct a test for whether 1 β  is equal to  2 β .  They 
are able to reject these hypotheses in almost all cases, since the estimate of  1 β  is usually much 
larger than that of  2 β .    
  As noted above, however, estimating (3) directly leads to inconsistent results, since the 
residual will contain changes in expected permanent income, and changes in current income, and 
these will likely be highly correlated with changes in housing and stock wealth.  This point is 
well-articulated in Campbell and Mankiw (1990), p. 266.  In order to estimate whether a variable 
− current changes in housing wealth, stock wealth, income, etc. − affects current consumption, it 
is necessary to use instrumental variables to get consistent estimates.  Since  t ε  is a residual and 
reflects only new information, any variable that is known at  1 − t  and is correlated with  t C Δ  is a 
valid instrument.  It is thus standard practice when testing the PIH (going back to Hall, 1978), to 
use lags of consumption or income changes as instruments in (3).  We will accordingly use lags 
of housing and stock wealth (as well as income or consumption changes) as instruments in (3).
4   
 
                                                 
2 In each of our models, we transform the raw variables as the log difference of their real, per capita values.  For a 
complete description of how the data are constructed, see CQS.  The complete dataset is available on John Quigley’s 
personal website at http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/data/CQSData072205.xls.  
3 Once again, we transform all variables into log differences of their real, per capita values.  Carroll, et al.’s data is 
available on Christopher Carroll’s personal website at http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/housing.html.   
4 Muellbauer (2007) also re-examines the CQS data.  However, in his re-examination, the author includes current 
income as a regressor (p. 283), which, as discussed, is endogenous, making his results subject to endogeneity bias. 
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IV.  Panel Results 
  Table 1 shows the results of re-estimating CQS’s model with a simple correction for the 
endogeniety problems discussed above.  In these regressions, the dependent variable is the 
contemporaneous change in consumption (quarterly log difference of retail sales), while the 
independent variables are all lagged log differences.  As in CQS, we present both OLS and Prais-
Winsten estimates (to control for possible autocorrelation induced by the time series component 
of the panel), and we also run the model with and without state and quarter (seasonal) fixed 
effects.   
  In each of these specifications, stock wealth has a positive, significant effect on next 
quarter’s consumption.  In contrast, changes in housing wealth typically have no impact on 
future consumption; the estimated housing wealth effect is small and statistically insignificant in 
six of the eight specifications considered.  The estimated housing wealth effect is significant only 
when state fixed effects are excluded from the model, and even then only at the 10 percent level 
and with a magnitude that is smaller than the estimated stock wealth effect.
5  We note that the 
coefficient on lagged income changes is negative, but as Romer (p. 341) notes, lagged changes in 
income may be of little value in forecasting future income.   
  The results in Table 1 show that lagged changes in housing wealth have no measurable 
impact on current changes in consumption.  Contemporaneous housing wealth effects, however, 
may not be fully captured by this specification.  In Table 2 we present results from a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression of instrumented contemporaneous changes in housing wealth, 
stock wealth and income on changes in consumption.  In the first four columns of this table, the 
                                                 
5 The differences are not statistically significant, however.     15
second through fourth lags of the exogenous variables are used as instruments, while in the last 
four columns the second through sixth lags are used as instruments.
6   
  As in Table 1, we find that the housing wealth effect is small and statistically-
insignificant, regardless of the number of lags or fixed-effects dummies employed.  Similarly, 
the stock wealth effect is always larger in magnitude than the estimated housing wealth 
coefficient and is always statistically significant.  Finally, note our estimated income coefficients 
fall within the 0.3-0.7 range found by Campbell and Mankiw (1990).   
  In Table 2, we used the specified lags of the exogenous variables as instruments.  As a 
robustness check, we ran one alternative specifications using lagged consumption in place of 
lagged income as instruments and another using both lagged income and consumption as 
instruments.  The results appear in the appendix in Tables A1 and A2.  When lags of 
consumption are used as instruments (Table A1), the estimated housing wealth effect is 
somewhat larger than that found in Table 2, but is only statistically significant (at the 10 percent 
level) in four of the eight specifications.  In every case, however, the estimated wealth effect is 
smaller in magnitude and less significant than the stock wealth effect, in direct contrast to the 
findings of CQS.  When both lagged income and consumption are used as instruments (Table 
A2), the housing wealth effect is somewhat larger and more significant when instrumenting with 
the 2
nd  through 4
th lags.  As before, however, the stock wealth effect is larger and more 
significant than the housing wealth effect.  Interestingly, the larger the estimated income 
coefficient, the smaller and less significant the housing wealth effect (which occurs when the 2
nd 
through 6
th lags are used).   
                                                 
6 Following Campbell and Mankiw (1990), we use twice-lagged values as instruments to avoid the measurement 
problem induced by the fact that the CQS consumption and income data are quarterly averages rather than values at 
a point in time.     16
  We summarize all of these results in Table 3.  In all, we find a positive and significant 
housing wealth effect in nine of the 24 specifications we ran, and only at the five percent level or 
higher when the 2
nd through 4
th lags of consumption and income are used as instruments.  In 
every instance, however, the estimated wealth effect was smaller in magnitude and statistical 
significance than the stock wealth effect.  These results suggest that the housing wealth effect 
found by CQS in fact reflects the fact that changes in housing wealth are correlated with changes 
in permanent income.  Once we control for this endogeneity, we find a much smaller housing 
wealth effect, consistent with the theoretical results of Buiter (2008) and Sinai and Souleles 
(2005). 
 
V.  Time Series Analysis 
In the previous section, we used CQS’s state-level panel data to show that prior estimates 
of a large housing wealth effect likely reflect an endogeneity problem.  Because changes in 
housing wealth are correlated with changes in permanent income, failing to control for this 
correlation will lead to a biased estimate of the impact of housing wealth on non-housing 
consumption.   
In our opinion, these panel data provide two distinct advantages over national time series 
data.  First, the CQS data provide a more accurate measure of housing wealth than the Federal 
Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts that are typically used in pure time series analyses.  
Furthermore, the more disaggregated structure of the database enhances the statistical power of 
our regressions.  Thus, we believe that the panel data results presented in Section IV are more 
compelling than those coming from time series data.     17
Nevertheless, given that much of the housing wealth effect literature uses aggregate time 
series data, it is worthwhile to investigate the extent to which this endogeneity bias may be 
affecting time series estimates of the housing wealth effect.  To do this, we re-run the analysis of 
Section IV using the aggregate U.S. time series data employed by Carroll, et al. (2006).   
The results of OLS regressions using lagged regressors are shown in Table 4.  The first 
four columns of this table report the results of regressions in which housing wealth is defined as 
non-stock wealth, following Carroll, et al. (2006).  Although our methodology differs 
substantially from theirs, we similarly find a large and significant housing wealth effect.  This is 
true whether we use one lag or four, and whether we include lagged income or consumption as 
instruments.   
As discussed above, however, Carroll, et al. (2006) measure housing wealth as total net 
worth minus stock wealth using Flow of Funds data.
7  This residual net worth includes assets 
besides stocks and housing, such as consumer durables, equipment and software, non-housing 
real estate holdings, wealth owned by non-profit organizations, and non-equity financial assets.  
In the fourth quarter of 2004, for instance, (the last observation in Carroll, et al.’s sample), more 
than half of “housing wealth” consists of non-housing wealth.   
Accordingly, we re-run our analysis using real estate owned by households as the 
measure of housing wealth, the results of which appear in the last four columns of Table 4.
8  
With only one lag, the estimated housing wealth effect is much smaller than it was using Carroll, 
et al.’s non-stock wealth, and the effect is now statistically insignificant.  When four lags are 
employed, the housing wealth effect is significant at the first three lags, but the sign changes 
                                                 
7 Specifically, Carroll, et al. (2006) use Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data and define stock wealth as equity by 
households, corporate equity by private pension funds, government retirement funds, bank trusts and estates, closed 
end funds, mutual funds and life insurance companies.  Non-stock wealth is then defined as total household and non-
profit net worth minus stock wealth.  All of these variables are expressed in real, per capita terms.   
8 Technically, we use the log difference of real, per capital real estate owned by households.     18
signs, with a positive effect at the first and third lags and a negative effect at the second and 
fourth lags.
9  As a result, the cumulative (four quarter) effect is very small and statistically 
insignificant.  Taken as a whole, the results in Table 3 suggest that the large housing wealth 
effect estimated in prior studies may be biased by the choice of housing wealth variable 
employed.   
As a further test of the potential for endogeneity bias, we break down durables and non-
durables consumption to see how each are affected by changes in housing wealth.  Because 
housing wealth should theoretically affect consumption primarily by relaxing borrowing 
constraints, we posit that housing wealth effects should be larger for durables than for non-
durables (since lumpy durables should be more sensitive to the relaxation of borrowing 
constraints).  On the other hand, if the housing wealth effect reflects the predictive role of 
housing wealth for permanent income, there should be little difference in the response of 
durables and non-durables consumption to housing wealth (since permanent income should 
affect durables and non-durables equally). 
The results of this analysis appear in Table 5.  Using either non-stock wealth or real 
estate owned by households as our proxy for housing wealth, we find a significant cumulative 
housing wealth effect only for non-durables.  Durables do generally show significant effects at 
the first, third and fourth lags, but the signs of these effects at different lags offset one another.  
In contrast, changes in housing wealth affect non-durables only at the first lag, with later lags 
having only small and insignificant effects.  We think these comparative results are best 
explained as reflecting simultaneity bias, which drives the short-term correlation between non-
durables consumption and one-quarter lagged housing wealth.   
                                                 
9 The results are similar regardless of whether consumption or income or both are used as instruments.     19
Finally, in results not reported here, we also ran two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions of instrumented contemporaneous changes in housing wealth, stock wealth and 
income on changes in consumption using time series data.  Regardless of the number of lags 
used, neither housing nor stock wealth is significant in these specifications.  We believe this lack 
of significance for either variable is attributable to noisy instrumenting in the time series 
regressions; the variance of the 2SLS estimate is larger than that of OLS (i.e. 2SLS entails larger 
standard errors), reflecting the fact that time series aggregation reduces the precision of statistical 
inference compared to the CQS panel data set. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  The Federal Reserve Board employs a model for the U.S. economy in which the housing 
wealth effect is constrained to be the same as that of stocks. Former Fed governor Frederic 
Mishkin (2007) performs several simulations in which he allows for the possibility that the 
impact of housing wealth may be double that of equity wealth (see Buiter, 2007, p. 32).
10  Fears 
of falling house prices dampening consumer spending have been cited by both market 
participants and government officials, and have guided policymaking. 
  Our panel estimation results reported in Section IV indicate that past estimates of a large 
housing wealth effect on consumption likely reflect an endogeneity bias.  When we control for 
this bias, we find that changes in housing wealth have perhaps no significant effect on 
consumption spending, or, at the very most, a positive impact that is much smaller than that of 
equity wealth.  Consistent with Buiter’s (2008) and Sinai and Souleles’ (2005) theoretical 
models, we find evidence for the view that housing, unlike stock wealth, has a weak effect on 
                                                 
10 Mishkin acknowledges, however, that the magnitude of the housing wealth effect is uncertain, and there are 
sensible arguments why they should be very small.     20
consumption, reflecting the fact that housing is not simply an asset such as equity; rather it is 
primarily a consumption good, and as such any wealth effects, if the exist at all, are highly 
muted.   
  Panel data on housing wealth at the state level are more accurate than flow of funds 
estimates, and the panel approach offers more powerful tests, due to greater degrees of freedom. 
Nevertheless, in Section V, we provide additional analysis of time series relationships, using 
flow of funds data to measure housing wealth.  We find that the results are highly sensitive to the 
choice of housing wealth measure, and when we use a “pure” measure of housing wealth (real 
estate owned by households), we find no significant housing wealth effect.   
  If this interpretation is correct, it has profound policy implications. The current decline in 
housing prices, driven by a combination of the bursting of the housing bubble, the recession, and 
the credit crunch, is not likely to exert an independent negative effect on consumption. If that is 
true, than macroeconomic stabilization policies that focus on income and employment 
stabilization will have a greater impact on consumption than policies that attempt to support 
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Housing  wealth 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.014 0.005 0.017 0.004 0.018 
  (0.830) (0.171) (0.886) (0.160) (0.636) (0.091) (0.687) (0.084) 
Stock  wealth  0.021 0.025 0.013 0.019 0.021 0.025 0.013 0.019 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.056) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.052) (0.003) 
Income  -0.080 -0.024 -0.135 -0.064 -0.069 -0.012 -0.126 -0.054 
  (0.002) (0.348) (0.000) (0.009) (0.006) (0.634) (0.000) (0.029) 
R-square  0.0529 0.0503 0.0193 0.0191 0.0435 0.0373 0.0092 0.0052 
State dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Quarter  dummies  Yes No Yes No 
Notes:  P-values shown in parentheses below the estimates.  The dependent variable is the contemporaneous change in consumption 
(quarterly log difference of state-level retail sales), while independent variables are lagged log differences.  OLS stands for ordinary least 
squares estimates, while PW stands for Prais-Winsten estimates.     
 
In the first column, OLS estimates show a very small, statistically-insignificant housing wealth effect.  In the second 
column, Prais-Winsten estimates (used to control for possible autocorrelation problems) also show a statistically-
insignificant wealth effect.  The third through eighth columns present robustness checks that test whether the 
estimated housing wealth effect is affected by the presence of state and quarter (seasonal) dummy variables.  The 
estimated housing wealth effect is small in all cases, and significant at the 10 percent level only in the Prais-Winsten 
estimates without state fixed-effects.     
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th Lags Used as Instruments  2
nd-6
th Lags Used as Instruments 
Housing  wealth 0.065 0.033 0.071 0.040 0.055 0.024 0.026 0.026 
  (0.369) (0.666) (0.325) (0.590) (0.354) (0.682) (0.648) (0.648) 
Stock  wealth  0.210 0.227 0.213 0.230 0.149 0.181 0.182 0.182 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income  0.472 0.589 0.473 0.583 0.441 0.604 0.607 0.607 
  (0.013) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F-test  p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 
State  dummies Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes No  No 
Quarter  dummies  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Notes:  P-values shown in parentheses below the estimates.  The dependent variable is the contemporaneous change in consumption 
(quarterly log difference of state-level retail sales), while independent variables are contemporaneous log differences of the listed variables, 
instrumented by the indicated lags of all exogenous variables.       
 
Regardless of the number of lags used to instrument the dependent variables or whether state or quarter fixed effects 
are included, the estimated housing wealth effect is small and statistically insignificant.  In contrast, we find a large 
and significant stock wealth effect.      
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Table 3 – Panel data robustness check summary 
Instruments 
Used Lags 








Income 2-4  0.065 0.033  0.071  0.040 
   (0.369)  (0.666)  (0.325)  (0.590) 
Consumption 2-4  0.112  0.102  0.127*  0.118 
   (0.144)  (0.179)  (0.085)  (0.109) 
Both 2-4  0.164**  0.144*  0.167**  0.149** 
   (0.027)  (0.060)  (0.021)  (0.047) 
Income 2-6  0.055 0.024  0.026  0.026 
   (0.354)  (0.682)  (0.648)  (0.648) 
Consumption 2-6  0.105*  0.094  0.103*  0.103* 
   (0.091)  (0.111)  (0.071)  (0.071) 
Both 2-6  0.102*  0.077  0.079  0.079 
   (0.075)  (0.180)  (0.160)  (0.160) 
Notes:  P-values shown in parentheses below the estimates; * significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** significant at the 5 percent level.   
 
This table summarizes the estimated housing wealth effect for the 
combinations of fixed-effect controls (state and time dummy variables), 
instrument lags (2-4 or 2-6), and the instruments used in addition to lagged 
housing wealth and stock wealth (income, consumption, or both).  Cell 
entries are the estimated housing wealth effect (and p-value) from the 
regressions reported in Tables 2, A1 and A2.     
 
The estimated housing wealth effect was insignificant in all but nine of the 24 
specifications, and significant at the 5 percent level in only three instances.  
In each case, the magnitude of the estimated housing wealth effect is smaller 
and less significant than the estimated stock wealth effect.   
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Table 4 – Time Series Results for Aggregate Consumption 
  Definition of “Housing Wealth” 
  NSW NSW NSW NSW  HHRE  HHRE  HHRE  HHRE 
HW (-1)  0.150 0.181 0.227 0.197 0.043 0.068 0.083 0.067 
  (0.036) (0.018) (0.002) (0.010) (0.253) (0.081) (0.033)  (0.093) 
HW (-2)   -0.128  -0.128  -0.141  -0.071  -0.066  -0.069 
   (0.113)  (0.086)  (0.074)   (0.085)  (0.093)  (0.093) 
HW (-3)    0.286 0.271 0.317    0.072 0.071 0.079 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.073)  (0.064)  (0.047) 
HW (-4)   -0.145  -0.175  -0.185  -0.060  -0.068  -0.064 
   (0.056)  (0.015)  (0.016)   (0.121)  (0.066)  (0.099) 
SW  (-1)  0.024 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.022 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
SW  (-2)    0.011 0.008 0.006    0.013 0.010 0.010 
   (0.042)  (0.128)  (0.222)   (0.013)  (0.051)  (0.072) 
SW (-3)    0.002  -0.003  -0.001    0.000  -0.005  -0.004 
   (0.699)  (0.621)  (0.789)   (0.984)  (0.366)  (0.481) 
SW  (-4)    0.010 0.007 0.007    0.011 0.009 0.008 
   (0.053)  (0.152)  (0.200)   (0.034)  (0.103)  (0.126) 
Inc.  (-1)  0.184  0.157  0.102  0.208  0.164  0.104 
 (0.001)  (0.003)    (0.084)  (0.000) (0.002)    (0.086) 
Inc.  (-2)   0.057  -0.027  0.084  -0.003 
   (0.284)  (0.668)  (0.118)  (0.958) 
Inc.  (-3)   -0.045  -0.080  0.008  -0.033 
   (0.406)  (0.189)  (0.876)  (0.602) 
Inc.  (-4)   -0.020  0.016  -0.007   0.006 
   (0.701)  (0.791)  (0.897)  (0.925) 
Cons. (-1)      0.212  0.167      0.208  0.155 
     (0.003)  (0.032)    (0.004)  (0.053) 
Cons. (-2)      0.079  0.086      0.122  0.109 
     (0.241)  (0.261)    (0.079)  (0.174) 
Cons. (-3)      0.074  0.124      0.077  0.104 
     (0.262)  (0.102)    (0.258)  (0.190) 
Cons.  (-4)    -0.164  -0.165    -0.111  -0.114 
     (0.012)  (0.022)    (0.102)  (0.133) 
R-Square 0.1849 0.3044 0.3323 0.3509 0.1725 0.2664 0.2886 0.3013 
Cum.  HW    0.194 0.195 0.188    0.009 0.020 0.013 
   (0.057)  (0.050)  (0.067)   (0.875)  (0.729)  (0.813) 
Cum.  SW    0.048 0.036 0.036    0.048 0.036 0.036 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)   (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Notes:  P-values shown in parentheses below the estimates.  HW refers to the housing wealth coefficients, 
whereas SW refers to the stock wealth coefficients.  In the first four columns, non-stock wealth (NSW) is 
used as the measure of housing wealth, while real estate owned by households (HHRE) is used in the final 
four columns.  The dependent variable is the log change in real, per capital total personal consumption 
expenditures, while all dependent variables are log-differences of the real, per capita values of the 
respective variables. 
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Table 5 – Durables Consumption Wealth Effects 

















HW (-1)  0.794  0.847 0.264 0.266 0.409 0.424 0.108  0.111 
 (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.031) (0.028) (0.008)  (0.009) 
HW (-2)  -0.504 -0.485 -0.031  -0.040  -0.322 -0.308  0.000  -0.008 
 (0.176)  (0.207)  (0.707)  (0.633)  (0.093) (0.115) (0.994)  (0.859) 
HW (-3)  1.177  1.188 0.079 0.092 0.425 0.416 0.002  0.011 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.334)  (0.267)  (0.025) (0.031) (0.963)  (0.803) 
HW (-4)  -0.831  -0.780 0.064  0.059 -0.367  -0.354 0.025  0.027 
 (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.418)  (0.463)  (0.044) (0.056) (0.527)  (0.513) 
SW  (-1)  0.092  0.088 0.021 0.021 0.081 0.079 0.020  0.020 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.000) 
SW  (-2)  0.092 0.087 -0.004 -0.005 0.100 0.094 -0.003  -0.004 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.529)  (0.428)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.566)  (0.459) 
SW (-3)  0.005  0.002  -0.001  -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.002  -0.005 
 (0.846)  (0.937)  (0.848)  (0.540)  (0.884) (0.775) (0.704)  (0.390) 
SW  (-4)  0.017  0.021 0.010 0.009 0.025 0.029 0.010  0.008 
 (0.518)  (0.442)  (0.061)  (0.142)  (0.349) (0.289) (0.073)  (0.171) 
Dur.  (-1) -0.038  -0.046   0.018  -0.031  -0.036   0.021 
 (0.588)  (0.520)    (0.249)  (0.665) (0.620)    (0.187) 
Dur.  (-2) 0.047  0.045  0.015  0.058  0.050   0.017 
 (0.483)  (0.517)    (0.318)  (0.390) (0.473)    (0.276) 
Dur. (-3)  -0.029  -0.026    -0.005 -0.032 -0.031    -0.005 
 (0.653)  (0.698)    (0.730)  (0.623) (0.649)    (0.738) 
Dur. (-4)  -0.109  -0.098    -0.017 -0.089 -0.086    -0.016 
 (0.091)  (0.140)    (0.237)  (0.176) (0.208)    (0.281) 
Nondur.  (-1)    0.077 0.153 0.138    0.073 0.176  0.157 
   (0.818)  (0.032)  (0.059)   (0.826)  (0.014)  (0.033) 
Nondur.  (-2)    0.030 0.170 0.170    0.165 0.203  0.201 
   (0.930)  (0.018)  (0.021)   (0.623)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Nondur.  (-3)    -0.169 0.059  0.071    -0.178 0.074  0.084 
   (0.613)  (0.408)  (0.330)   (0.593)  (0.308)  (0.249) 
Nondur. (-4)    -0.273  -0.137  -0.118  -0.190  -0.112  -0.093 
   (0.400)  (0.048)  (0.095)   (0.559)  (0.111)  (0.193) 
R-Square  0.2209 0.2255 0.2647 0.2792 0.2076 0.2111 0.2303  0.247 
Cum.  HW  0.636  0.770 0.376 0.377 0.145 0.178 0.135  0.141 
 (0.163)  (0.124)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.594) (0.531) (0.025)  (0.026) 
Cum.  SW  0.206  0.198 0.026 0.021 0.202 0.194 0.025  0.019 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.060)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.032)  (0.112) 
Notes:  P-values shown in parentheses below the estimates.  HW refers to the housing wealth coefficients, 
whereas SW refers to the stock wealth coefficients.  In the first four columns, non-stock wealth (NSW) is used 
as the measure of housing wealth, while real estate owned by households (HHRE) is used in the final four 
columns.  The dependent variable is the log change in real, per capital total personal consumption expenditures, 
while all dependent variables are log-differences of the real, per capita values of the respective variables.   28
 
 




th Lags Used as Instruments  2
nd-6
th Lags Used as Instruments 
Housing  wealth 0.112 0.102 0.127 0.118 0.105 0.094 0.103 0.103 
  (0.144) (0.179) (0.085) (0.109) (0.091) (0.111) (0.071) (0.071) 
Stock  wealth  0.182 0.200 0.194 0.213 0.118 0.097 0.107 0.107 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) 
Income  0.127 0.232 0.148 0.240 0.149 0.207 0.227 0.227 
  (0.463) (0.123) (0.389) (0.108) (0.358) (0.144) (0.105) (0.105) 
F-test  p-value  0.0001 0.7841 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.9083 0.0003 0.0003 
State  dummies Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes No  No 
Quarter  dummies  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Notes:  P-values shown in parentheses below the estimates.  The dependent variable is the contemporaneous change in consumption 
(quarterly log difference of state-level retail sales), while independent variables are contemporaneous log differences of the listed variables, 
instrumented by the indicated lags of housing wealth, stock wealth and consumption.       
 
Using lagged consumption rather than lagged income as an instrument has little effect on the results.  As in Table 2, 
the estimated stock wealth effect is large and statistically significant, although the magnitude is somewhat smaller 
when the 2
nd through 6
th lags are used as instruments.  The estimated housing wealth effect is somewhat larger, and 
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in four of the eight specifications, although its magnitude is never 
larger than the stock wealth effect.  Interestingly, the income coefficient ceases to be significant in these 
specifications.   
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th Lags Used as Instruments  2
nd-6
th Lags Used as Instruments 
Housing  wealth 0.164 0.144 0.167 0.149 0.102 0.077 0.079 0.079 
  (0.027) (0.060) (0.021) (0.047) (0.075) (0.180) (0.160) (0.160) 
Stock  wealth  0.236 0.273 0.241 0.278 0.143 0.172 0.173 0.173 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income  0.184 0.300 0.202 0.305 0.300 0.448 0.461 0.461 
  (0.285) (0.045) (0.243) (0.042) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F-test  p-value  0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000 
State  dummies Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes No  No 
Quarter  dummies  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Notes:  P-values shown in parentheses below the estimates.  The dependent variable is the contemporaneous change in consumption 
(quarterly log difference of state-level retail sales), while independent variables are contemporaneous log differences of the listed variables, 
instrumented by the indicated lags of housing wealth, stock wealth, income and consumption.       
 
When both lagged consumption and lagged income are used as instruments, the housing wealth effect is larger and 
more statistically significant than in other specifications (Tables 2 and A1).  As before, however, the stock wealth 
effect is larger and more significant than the housing wealth effect.  Interestingly, the larger the estimated income 
coefficient, the smaller and less significant the housing wealth effect.     
 
 